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Denis Diderot’s ideas about war and peace crystalize many of the 
contradictions in the world that he identified. On the one hand, war is a natural 
product of contradictions between natural law and human developments. On the 
other hand, it can and should always be subject to moral judgment based on a 
wide-ranging knowledge of history and context. War can be good if it eliminates 
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tyranny, and bad if it limits freedom, equality, and prosperity. Peace can be good 
if it cultivates the latter, and bad if it freezes inequality. Diderot never allows 
himself to rest on universal judgments for all times and all places, but insists upon 
never-ending comparisons and contrasts between the moral world and the natural 
world. Philosophical materialism provides the basis for his understanding of the 
world, but morals provide the instruments of judgment.
Key-words: Denis Diderot, war, peace, nature, materialism, morality, colonialism.
Resumen 
Las ideas de Denis Diderot sobre la guerra y la paz revelan muchos de las 
contradiciones que el identificó en el mundo. Por un lado, la guerra es un producto 
natural de contradiciones entre la ley de la natura y las instituciones humanas. 
Por otro lado, siempre debe ser sometido a juicio moral basado en conocimiento 
amplia de la historia y contexto. La guerra puede ser buena si derota a la tiranía, 
y mala si limita a la libertad e igualdad. La paz puede ser buena si aumenta a la 
libertad, la igualdad, y la prosperidad, y mala si mantiene la desigualdad. Diderot 
nunca se permite juicios universales por todos los tiempos y todos los sitios, pero 
insista en comparaciones y contrastes sin fin entre el mundo moral y el mundo 
natural. El materialismo filosófico es el fundamento de su manera de entender el 
mundo, pero los aspectos morales son sus instrumentos de juicio.  
Palabras-clave: Denis Diderot, la guerra, la paz, la naturaleza, el materialismo, la 
moralidad, el colonialismo.
What did Diderot say about war and peace? When and how did he justify 
war? Did he promote revolution, or did he prefer reform? Assessments of 
Diderot’s thought on war and peace range broadly. On one end of the spectrum, 
he is considered “reform-minded” and an advocate of organic social change3. On 
the other end, he is held to be “the first effective advocate in the modern world 
of social and political reconstruction through violent revolution”4.Some argue 
that Diderot moderated his views on war over time, distancing himself from 
the Lockean right to revolution that he endorsed in his Encyclopedia articles 
“Autorité politique” (1751; errata added 1754) and “Droit naturel” (1755)5. 
Others portray his thought as increasingly radical, culminating in the advocacy 
3  Dennis C. Rasmussen, “Burning Laws and Strangling Kings? Voltaire and Diderot on the Perils 
of Rationalism in Politics”, The Review of Politics, 73 (2003), pp. 77-104.
4 Anthony Strugnell, Diderot’s Politics: A Study of the Evolution of Diderot’s Political Thought 
After the Encyclopedie, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. 
5  Rasmussen 2003.
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of a general right to insurrection and the necessity of violent revolution in both 
Europe and the colonies6.
It is our intention to piece together the story Diderot told in Observations 
on the Nakaz (1767),7 in the excerpts he contributed to Raynal’s Philosophical 
and Political History of the Two Indies (1770-1783)8, in his Supplément to the 
Voyage of Bougainville (1773)9, and other places—about the descent into war. 
We argue that Diderot views nature as vast and dynamic: its motions, for all 
their regularity, lie nevertheless largely beyond the scope of our perception. 
Nature therefore declines to delineate clear and robust positive prescriptions, 
and it is dynamic enough to encompass a broad (yet still limited) range 
of behaviors. Thus Diderot posits a sparse and abstract theory of natural 
law that avoids both cultural relativism and the positive prescriptions that 
would attend a more robust natural law. Given a broad range of possible 
moral behaviors, Diderot argues, humans ought to consider their particular 
geographical and social circumstances and use reason to forge positive laws 
that aim at the common good, modifying the laws as necessary. Through the 
ongoing modification of laws to accord with nature and circumstances, peace 
is maintained. However, as positive laws become beholden to particular 
interests, their connection to the common good and accordance with 
nature become increasingly distorted. Finally, their contradictions become 
unbearable. War is the result. 
Set against the background of his theory of human nature as a set 
of dynamic and highly varied behaviors, it is remarkable how many of the 
interventions that Diderot makes in the History of the Two Indies are moral 
judgments. Moral evaluations help explain and justify society’s descent into 
revolution, why colonialism is particularly evil but also why, at least in the 
European context, war may be inadvisable. As we will show, Diderot argues 
6  Yves Benot, De l’atheisme a l’anticolonisme, Paris, Librairie François Maspero, 1981, pp. 
22, 154.
7  Denis Diderot, Observations sur le Nakaz, [in Paul Vernière, ed.: Œuvres politiques, Paris, 
Éditions Garnier Frères, 1963]; Denis Diderot, Political Writings, John Hope Mason and Robert 
Wokler, eds., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992 [hereafter cited in parentheses in the 
text as “ON” followed by the page number in Vernière, the section number, and the page number in 
Mason and Wokler]. In Spanish, see Denis Diderot, Escritos políticos, Antonio Hermosa Andújar, ed., 
Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1989.
8  Guillaume-Thomas Raynal [and Denis Diderot], Histoire philosophique et politique des 
Établissemens et du commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes, Neuchâtel, Libraires Associés, 
1783; hereafter abbreviated HDI; Denis Diderot, Extracts from the Histoire des Deux Indes [in John 
Hope Mason and Robert Wokler, eds.: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992] [hereafter cited 
in parentheses in the text as “HDI” followed by book and page number of the French edition and the 
page number in Mason and Wokler, if available]
9  Denis Diderot, Supplément au voyage de Bougainville [in H. Dieckmann, J. Proust, and J. Varloot, 
eds. Oeuvres complètes, Paris, Hermann, 1975-2004] hereafter abbreviated DPV; Denis Diderot, “The 
Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville [in John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler, eds.: Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992] [hereafter cited in parentheses in the text as “SVB” followed by 
the page number in DPV and the page number in Mason and Wokler]. 
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that revolutions are more likely to be undertaken for the wrong reason (power) 
than for the right one (liberty). In what follows we will explore the role of 
Diderot’s moral philosophy in his theory of war and peace. 
Though we pay most attention to Diderot’s later and most explicitly 
political texts—the Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville, his additions to 
Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes, the Observations sur le Nakaz—this by 
no means implies the irrelevance of his earlier Encyclopedia articles or even 
his scientific, dramatic, or aesthetic works. In fact, we aim to demonstrate 
that Diderot’s views on war are, like so many other aspects of his thought, 
extensions of his view of nature10. By concentrating on Diderot’s explicit 
statements on war found mostly in certain later texts, we do not mean to imply 
that earlier or ostensibly apolitical texts are irrelevant to his political thought. In 
fact, couching his thought on war in the framework of his broader philosophy 
of nature reveals its most distinctive aspects.
From natural law to positive law
In Diderot’s view, society descends into war after natural rights have been 
repeatedly and systematically violated. What did he mean by “natural rights”? 
In the article “Droit naturel”, he notes that everyone seems to have a different 
idea of which rights appear most glaringly self-evident. To clarify this debate, 
he endeavors to filter out all but the most self-evident of the self-evident by 
way of critical examination. (Of course, this is merely doing what all natural 
law theorists claim to do—an obvious objection apparently lost on him). By 
rejecting a divine origin and emphasizing the primacy of the situation-specific 
common good, Diderot does manage to arrive at a comparatively attenuated 
natural law11. He argues that our reason, working in accordance with our natural 
sociability, can enlighten us as to the best way to interpret abstract natural law 
to fulfill the volonté générale, in effect arguing from the common good back 
to natural law instead of the other way around. In this article and elsewhere, he 
refrains from fleshing out the content of what he considers natural law, preferring 
instead that it remain abstract and thus amenable to a variety of interpretations 
and behaviors. He even criticizes Beccaria, who would seem like a natural ally, 
for basing his penal reforms on inflexible natural laws instead of the common 
10  Several recent studies of Diderot have undertaken to demonstrate how many topics in his 
famously vast and protean œuvre are not as disconnected as they are often characterized, but are rather 
unified by an underlying conception of nature that illuminates his positions on issues ostensibly far 
removed from nature: his art criticism, his drama, his economic theory, and, as we argue, his position 
on war. See Colas Duflo, Diderot philosophe, Paris, Honoré Champion, 2003. 
11  Sankar Muthu makes a similar argument about Diderot’s moral thought in the colonial context. 
See Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003.
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good12. The common good is the thing to aim at, and there are a few abstract 
values that will always accord with it. These could be called natural laws. It is 
sufficient, however, to simply appeal to the common good without employing 
the language of natural law, since an appeal to natural law has a tendency to 
ossify our ideas.
What substance he did clarify, however, emphasized basic individual 
liberties such as freedom of conscience, expression, the press, and religion13.
Securing these civil rights was arguably the fundamental political goal of 
the Encyclopédie14. Sexual freedom was also an important natural right 
for Diderot. Never an apologist for monogamy, he held most constraints on 
sex to be distortions of human nature, contrary to both individual and social 
good15. In addition, Diderot was committed to property rights; they are, after 
all, crucial for the expression of individual liberties16. In one of his frequent 
recommendations for securing the right to property in the Obervations sur le 
Nakaz (LX; DPV; 118), he argues that laws will not contradict, no matter how 
numerous, if they all aim at the fixed points of liberty and property. Such rights, 
appropriately tailored to a people’s circumstances, will always tend towards the 
common good. 
What is the relationship between natural law and positive law? After 
all, nature contains sentiments of sociability and enmity, thus positive laws 
cannot be the essential consequences of natural law (ON, 372; XXX; 102). 
Diderot points out that even sociable sentiments turn to vices when taken in 
isolation, as when compassion for a criminal trumps justice (HDI, 19:291-294; 
212), and he frequently criticizes the physiocratic claim to derive positive law 
directly from natural law (e.g. ON, 365-366; XIX; 96-97). Yet even though 
positive law does not necessarily follow natural law, it can and should accord 
with it. This accordance results when reasonable people reflect on the scope 
of behaviors contained in the natural law and consider which behaviors would 
best harmonize with the common good in the context of their particular society. 
Through a dialogic synthesis with nature and our empirical reality, we arrive at 
12  Benot 1981, p. 141. Diderot criticizes the use of capital punishment in the Observations (ON 
373-5; XXXV; 103-104). However, unlike Beccaria, Diderot’s concern with social utility keeps him 
from totally rejecting it. See (ON 343-344; I; 81) and (ON 395-396; LXII; 119). 
13  In one contribution to the History of the Two Indies (HDI 10:120-122; 183) Diderot spells out 
several arguments in support of freedom of expression: to limit expression only demonstrates the 
sovereign’s inclination to tyranny; when men of genius are silenced, the nation is less able to discern 
its true interest; authors are invigorated by rebellious sentiment; it makes the sovereign, who has an 
entire army, look weak if he is afraid of a few writings. Inevitably there will emerge stupid ideas, but 
he asks, “Is it better for a people to be eternally deadened than sometimes troublesome?” 
14  A.M. Wilson, “The development and scope of Diderot’s political thought”, Studies on Voltaire 
and the Eighteenth Century, 27 (1963), pp. 1871-1900.
15  See Orou’s speech and the discussion of the Miss Polly Baker episode in section three of SVB 
(599-616; 47-58).
16  See for example ON (379-380; XLIV; 107), (367-368; XXI; 98), (381-382; XLVI; 108-109), and 
(396; LXIII; 119); HDI (9:37-38).
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a code of civil and religious law that accords with nature, but which nature in 
and of itself cannot prescribe17.
The distinction between necessarily following and according with is an 
important one because it is the basis of Diderot’s self-differentiation from 
Rousseau. Though Diderot sometimes appears to be acquiescing in a Rousseauan 
idealization of nature (“Nature made all the good laws; it is the legislator 
who makes them public” (ON, 371; XXVII; 101)), he is in fact consciously 
opposing such idealism. Indeed, some of Diderot’s clarifications demonstrate 
that he realizes that his audience is liable to conflate their positions18. Consider 
this exchange in his Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville (630; 67), in 
which A draws the incorrect (Rousseauan) conclusion from B’s observation 
that men are subject to a natural code, a civil code, and a religious code: 
A: …the last two should be strictly patterned on the first, which we carry with 
us engraved in our hearts, and which is always the strongest.
B: That’s not quite right. We have no more in common with other human beings 
at birth than an organic similarity of form, the same need, and attraction to the 
same pleasures and a shared aversion to the same pains. These are the things 
which make man what he is, and which should form the basis of the morality 
suited to him.
How is B’s position different from A’s? If natural pleasures and aversions 
are the basis of our morality, is this not the same as morality being “strictly 
patterned on” the natural code? Yet we are told, “That’s not quite right”. Though 
the natural code limits the scope of all possible reasonable moral behavior, 
reasonable people must then reflect on precisely which elements of the natural 
code are conducive to the common good, taking into account the concrete 
situation of a particular society. While there are a variety of moral ways a 
society might approach sex that could accord with natural law, for example, 
a society comprised of only one gender (HDI, 9:274-277), or a society which 
severely punishes only women for adultery (SVB, 599-616; 47-58) would fall 
outside the scope of our nature. 
In addition to emphasizing the variety of positive laws that may potentially 
follow from nature, Diderot emphasizes the necessity for frequently reevaluating 
positive laws. Clinging too tightly to existing laws or legal commentaries 
blinds us to the adjustments necessary for maintaining the common good in 
a dynamic society. Diderot rarely admires tradition, usually portraying it as a 
blinding force with no role to play in our political thought. Dynamic societies 
17  See Dena Goodman, “The Structure of Political Argument in Diderot’s Supplément au Voyage de 
Bougainville”, Diderot Studies, 21 (1983), pp. 123-137.
18  See HDI 6:257-259: “Ce n’est pas toutfois que je préférasse l’état sauvage à l’état civilisé. C’est 
une protestation que j’ai déjà faite plus d’une fois”.
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require “good magistrates” who, though elite, are constantly re-evaluating the 
public good in light of reason and nature19. Hence laws may be both perpetually 
fixed towards the ends of liberty and property (ON, 379-380; XLIV; 107) and 
frequently changed.
It is interesting that Diderot rejects both tradition and overarching, rational 
political projects. This is a surprising contrast to the Enlightenment’s scientific 
outlook, which is often characterized as logically resulting in the rejection of 
the former and the embrace of the latter. Diderot’s scientific outlook, however, 
is grounded in a view of nature as dynamic, enormous, and infinitely complex. 
Consequently, perception is inevitably partial. Reason ought to be continually 
applied anew and conclusions ought not be so conclusive20. Thus reason 
trumps tradition and systematization: both calcify our thoughts, behaviors, 
and institutions so that, failing to adapt to an evolving society, they become 
antiquated and incongruous. This incongruity presages war. 
The descent into war
Reasonable legislators will not always wisely determine contextually-
appropriate positive laws that accord with nature. Over time, social hierarchies 
develop, and different factions—such as the aristocracy, the monarchy, or priests—
begin to make laws and customs with a view towards their own particular interests, 
without regard for either the common good or the limits of nature. They may enslave, 
coercively colonize, or denounce perfectly innocent sexual behavior. A sovereign 
may forget to associate his own good with the good of his nation—“He thinks he 
is at war with it”—and thereby condemns his people to hunger (ON, 379-380; 
XLIV; 107). Religion and “l’esprit de conquêtes” detach Europeans from concern 
for the wellbeing of all (HDI, 6:137-139). As these self-interested laws proliferate, 
they become increasingly contradictory—not only contradicting nature and the 
common good, but contradicting other laws. When a nation’s laws are at odds with 
its geography and social situation, a nation is bound to be disorderly (9:233). And 
everything against nature is fated to end (13:113). Unsustainable contradictions cause 
more and more human suffering (18:273-279; 200). Finally, this fraught situation 
reaches a fever pitch and the “fermentation violente” explodes. Society buckles under 
these strained layers of contradiction and descends into a state of war. 
19 ON, 387; LII; 113. Diderot distrusted the masses as repositories of political wisdom and was 
more inclined to trust elite legislators and magistrates because he thought these elites could be more 
flexible in their reasoning, not, as Geoffrey Bremner argues, because they could more effectively weave 
a monolithic façade of order. Geoffrey Bremner, Order and Chance: The Pattern of Diderot’s Thought, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. See also ON (377-378; XL; 106) and (389; LIV; 114).
20  Diderot’s fiction, too, was written in such a way as to bring about the continually renewed 
application of reason. See Whitney Mannies, “The Style of Materialist Skepticism: Diderot’s Jacques 
le fataliste”, Philosophy and Literature, forthcoming. 
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In this way, Diderot’s vision of the breaking point of revolution is animated 
by his vision of nature. It would be wrong to presuppose, however, that his was a 
monolithic nature, progressing along predictable mechanical laws or following 
inexorably through determined stages of historical progression: this is the nature 
of Helvétius, de Quesnay, or La Mettrie. Diderot’s view, on the other hand, is in 
the vein of Lucretius and Epicurus: nature is so vast and dynamic and our own 
ability to perceive its connections is so limited that the idea of predicting and 
controlling nature is no more than vain pretense. Diderot’s materialism resulted 
in skepticism regarding inflexible and grand social and political systems which 
resist being modified to accommodate nature’s dynamism or our changing and 
increasing knowledge of nature.21 Older societies have accrued layer upon 
layer of inflexible institutions, all more interested in perpetuating themselves 
than in adjusting to differences in nature and the common good. Eventually, 
these inflexible institutions become so contradictory and contrary to the public 
good that reasonable behavior is impossible. The laws of nature are violated 
by civil laws (HDI 17:27). Revolution results from this untenable conflict 
between institutions and nature. In essence, revolutionary violence emerges 
when political and moral systems have become so distant from our natural 
inclinations that they cannot be remedied without painful breaks. Revolution 
is not a return to nature, but a return to a society where natural inclinations are 
appropriately tailored for a people’s context.
As we have mentioned, Diderot often adds the moral dimension to his 
treatment of war. One of his contributions to the last book of the HDI is a 
contrast of two visions of war. The first is that one day war will be forgotten, 
rejected by all for its odious results (19:135). The second is that kings have 
no conscience, and pursue war at the great expense of their subjects and only 
for glory (19:136). At another point, he contrasts the moral effects of ancient 
versus modern war, to the detriment of the latter (19:148-149). Nature may be 
what leads us to war, but it can and should still be evaluated by moral standards.
War in the colonial context: additional moral factors
Colonialism has added a new, severe twist to this story as a result of three 
factors: the clash of European laws and mœurs with the climate and social 
context of colonized lands; the distance that separates European travelers from 
the socialized politesse of their homelands; and the character of the Europeans 
who choose to go abroad. Different continents are a natural limit of power 
(13:113). But here the problem is not only distance and fossilized laws and 
21  See Whitney Mannies, “Denis Diderot and the Politics of Materialist Skepticism” [in John 
Christian Laursen and Gianni Paganini, eds.: Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2014].
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structures that try to stand against nature, but also that moral factors cause 
trouble.
First, less “civilized” societies are less likely to have experienced the 
distorting factionalism resulting from increased social complexity, so their laws 
and mœurs are thereby more likely to accord with natural law and the general 
good. Left alone, they would perhaps endure many generations before their 
societies contrast so untenably with nature and reason. European colonization, 
however, has suddenly imposed itself, and in one fell swoop indigenous people 
have suffered from a double imposition: the conflict of European laws and 
mœurs with reason and nature is compounded with their being applied in a 
wholly inappropriate climate and social context. Europeans may, after all, have 
some laws and mœurs that are appropriate for them, and for better or worse, 
they may be inured to those that are not. Where laws are so ill-adapted to the 
complicated situations they wish to govern, discontent is likely (8:165-166).
Second, distance has unmoored European explorers and colonizers from 
their social bearings, resulting in an unbridled psychology of domination. In 
the HDI he writes,
In distancing themselves from their homeland, they are no longer restrained by 
the fear of blushing before the eyes of their fellow citizens. In a hot climate, 
where the body loses its vigor, the soul must lose its strength. In a country 
where nature and customs lead to indolence, they are led astray. In the countries 
where they come to enrich themselves, they easily forget to be just (3:67-68).
And later:  
Beyond the Equator a man is neither English, Dutch, French, Spanish, nor Por-
tuguese. He retains only those principles and prejudices of his native country 
which justify or excuse his conduct… He is a domestic tiger returning to the 
forest; the thirst for blood takes hold of him once more (9:233-235; 178).
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the hypocrisy of the English who are 
so dedicated to liberty at home yet so unrestrained abroad (HDI, 18:286-287; 
178). Without the moral ties that limit our cruelty and domination at home, we 
become inhumane (HDI, 8:196). Distance, both physical and cultural, makes it 
nearly impossible for any magistrate to be wise enough to govern a colony well 
(10:53-54). It is very strange that Europe should be transplanted to America, 
and it will occur sooner or later that the climate will reassert its influence 
over unsuitable laws that are unable to resist the movement of nature (9:237). 
Sankar Muthu (2003) notes that this is the basis of Diderot’s argument against 
colonialism: no distant territory is likely to be justly ruled by a foreigner who 
is unfamiliar with the local context. What is more, he argues, Diderot’s sparse 
natural law means that “no universally valid, privileged political ideology 
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exists that could guide a would-be conqueror” (79-80). As John Pocock puts 
it, Diderot seems to ask “whether navigation… may not have something in it 
contrary to human nature”22. 
Third, Diderot characterizes those who would leave their home to 
explore the world as particularly likely to be unscrupulous. He wonders at the 
motivations that drew the “freebooters” to want to explore and conquer other 
lands. Those who are detached from their homes are more likely to commit 
violence and atrocities because they do not feel the strings of mutual affection 
and sociability that bind them to their fellow men, nor are they sensible to the 
socialized limits that constrain us in our most domineering behavior. These 
ruffians deserve the abhorrence with which we often think of them, since their 
instances of virtue did not impede the atrocities they witnessed or perpetuated 
(HDI, 10:111-114). Traveling is likely an immoral occupation, since the 
traveler spurns his home for another, driven on by guilt, ambition, and tyranny. 
In pre-civilised times, hospitality provided travelers room and board, and this 
was considered a sacred debt to be preserved and repaid perhaps centuries 
later. Such exchanges occur less and less as travelers become more rapacious, 
and traditional relations of hospitality are replaced with financial relationships 
(9:246-248). Diderot reflects on the motivations that would lead one to become 
a missionary: religious fervor? Concern for humankind? Not likely. Really, it is 
the desire of being treated as a god, king, or beloved father among humans one 
views as lesser—a very base motivation indeed (9:80-81). The special moral 
depravity attending colonialism disconnects government from nature and the 
common good in an exceptionally severe way. 
There is, however, a far more direct justification of the war of the 
colonized against their colonizers, and that is the law of nations, which justifies 
a sovereign people’s self-defense. The colonizer is due no more consideration 
than would a foreign invader, for “Conquérir ou spolier avec violence, c’est 
la même chose. Le spoliateur et l’homme violent sont toujours odieux” (4: 
249). Scholars sometimes characterize Diderot’s appeals for colonized peoples 
to revolt as calls for revolution, but this is not right. When one considers that 
he was merely exhorting sovereign people to protect themselves from foreign 
invaders, his appeals are remarkable not for being so radical, but for being so 
thoroughly conventional. What is radical, however, is the equation of European 
commerce with injustice and coercion. When doing business with an inhabited 
country, Europeans who abrogate those people’s liberty or property can be 
justly expelled or killed (8:105-108). Thus Diderot does not hesitate to call 
on colonized peoples to resist. His speech to the Hottentots is particularly 
rhetorical: the Europeans, “ravira l’innocence et la liberté. Ou, si vous vous 
22  J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume 4: Barbarians, Savages and Empires, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 255.
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en sentez le courage, prenez vos haches, tendez vos arcs, faite plevoir sur ces 
étrangers vos fleches empoisonnées. Puisse-t-il n’en rester aucun pour porter à 
leurs concitoyens la nouvelle de leur desastre!” (2:240). These exhortations are 
spread across the globe, whether it be in Africa (the Hottentots), Asia (India), 
Oceana (the Tahitians), South America, or North America23.
Note that it is not the case that all commerce is bad. One scholar has noted that 
Diderot seems to “reveal a generalized ambivalence about luxury – it was often 
both loved and hated simultaneously”, and that in discussing colonial commerce 
he “argued both sides in a posture best understood as ambivalent”24. But this is not 
quite right, either. As Terjanian also notes, commerce has done some great things 
such as ending slavery (it was not Christianity that ended it, he insists), and it is 
also “an essentially civilizing, liberalizing, and pacifying agent” (83, 87). But it has 
also caused great problems: at the core of the issue of monopoly, for example, for 
Diderot “were the moral problems” it caused (153). Commercial wars are against 
nature, Diderot writes, but he also observes that they are frequent (HDI, 19:186). 
So it is not ambivalence, but rather that sometimes commerce has good results 
and sometimes it has bad results, which seems hard to deny. If one is consistently 
liberal, one will only support commerce when it has those good effects, and one 
will criticize it when it has bad effects. And that seems to describe Diderot. 
The morality of war in the European context
But if the clash of social and political institutions with reason and nature 
is starker for colonized peoples for the reasons mentioned above, this does not 
mean that Europe lacks such clashes. “Benevolent despotism”, which Diderot 
clearly opposes, is subversive of natural law because, despite whatever justice 
and enlightenment a tyrant may demonstrate, and even despite the fact that his or 
her actions may work in the short term toward the people’s advantage, benevolent 
despotism inherently deprives men of their liberty, undermining the very basis 
of their humanity25. And unfortunately, despotism—benevolent and otherwise—
pervades Europe as elsewhere: 
Il n’est que trop vrai: la plupart des nations sont dans les fers. La multitude est 
généralement sacrifiée aux passions de quelques oppresseurs privilégiés…le 
citoyen, dépouillé du produit de son travail par les besoins sans cesse renaissans 
d’un gouvernement avide ou obéré, est continuellement gêné sur les moyens les 
plus légitimes d’arriver au bonheur (HDI, 11:283).
23  Diderot is clearly in favor of the American Revolution. See HDI (18:273-279).
24  Anoush F. Terjanian, Commerce and Its Discontents in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67, 152.  
25  See Diderot’s article “Autorité politique” (DPV, 537-545; p. 207 in Mason and Wokler). Also 
see HDI (19:39-42).
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Still, Diderot makes it clear that the European situation is not quite so 
desperate as the colonial one, whose abominable condition “n’est pas la même 
que la nôtre” and which calls for immediate amelioration (HDI, 11:283).
One leitmotif in Diderot’s writings on colonialism is the warnings, often 
highly rhetorical, that he gives to European monarchs, foretelling violent and 
humiliating punishment for their inhumane behavior:
Vous ne pensez pas qu’on n’avilit point un peuple sans de fâcheuses con-
séquences. Son honneur peut s’endormir pendant quelque tems: mais tôt our 
tard il se réveille et se venge; et comme de toute les injures l’humiliation est 
la plus offensante, c’est aussi la plus vivement sentie et la plus cruellement 
vengée26.
But why waste words trying to convince tormentors to give up their 
tormenting? In fact nature speaks more strongly to those who are oppressed, 
and slaves will, in time, rise up if they have someone to lead them. Then no 
European power will be spared.
He also frequently warns European monarchs and merchants that, if they 
persist in their inhuman policies, they will most certainly be the object of a 
violent and humiliating revolution abroad27. And while Raynal’s Histoire des 
deux Indes may single out Spain as the most ruthless28, all European colonial 
powers are the recipients of frequent invectives. Great Britain, which Diderot 
greatly admires as a beacon of liberty and constitutional government, is singled 
out for its hypocrisy. He characterizes the English attack on the Dutch without 
a declaration of war as savage and uncivilized (17:113). And perhaps most 
remarkably, he calls for French naval rearmament in order to reverse the British 
gains of 1763 (Pocock, 293). The HDI can be understood as “a document of 
state, a programme to enlist Enlightenment in the cause of a French recovery 
from the disasters of 1763” (Pocock, 323; cf. 325). 
Yet while Diderot often predicts revolution, he never actually recommends 
it to European subjects. While he clearly thinks that Catherine II is a despot, 
political change in Russia ought to be accomplished through education, or even 
the strategic introduction of Swiss settlers (ON, 351; IV; 86)! Diderot stops 
short of recommending war in the European context because he seems to think 
it far more likely that war will result not in liberty, but in more factionalism. 
Diderot describes two kinds of war: a war of faction, in which certain groups 
seek ascendancy over others, and wars of liberty, where citizens fight (violently 
26 HDI (5:275). Also see (8:232 and 11:275).
27  See HDI, 4:249-254; 18:292-293; 11:200-201; 7:284-285; 8:118-119.
28  Maria Jose Villaverde, La Conquista y colonización de la América española, según la Historia 
de las dos Indias del abate Raynal [in Francisco Castilla, ed., Discursos de conquista y colonización: 
qué pasó al sur y al norte de América, Alcalá de Henares, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alcalá 
de Henares, 2014]. 
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or otherwise) to dismantle noxious factions and restore a reasonable social 
order in accordance with nature29. During civil wars people are divided into 
factions, each looking to its own interest, and people destroy each other 
without reason: “Les intérêts particuliers et les haines personnelles font durer 
les troubles publics; et l’on ne commence à s’expliquer que quand on est las de 
carnage” (HDI, 7:317). The outcomes of civil war are no better—and are often 
worse—when war is motivated by the desire to tyrannize in place of the tyrant: 
“But when the dissensions have an impure source, when slaves fight among 
themselves to choose a tyrant, or ambitious men fight to oppress, or criminals 
to share out spoils, the peace which ends such horrors is scarcely preferable to 
the war that gave birth to them…” (7:321; 174).
Government is such a “very complicated machine” that premature 
revolution threatens to bring anarchy, not a renewal of liberty30. Impatient 
subjects throw off the oppression of their sovereign, but, lacking a spirit of 
liberty, they begin to devour each other, or what is equally dangerous, dissolve 
into a defenseless anarchy. Foreign invaders take advantage of the weakness, 
and the people may ultimately be worse off than they were before (1:171-172; 
170-171).
On the other hand, revolt can have positive consequences when it is 
motivated by liberty: “When the horrors of tyranny and the instinct of liberty 
put weapons into the hands of bold men, and they are victorious, then the calm 
which follows this temporary calamity is a time of the greatest happiness” 
(7:321; 174). The true citizen described in the article “Citoyen” genuinely 
looks past his own self-interest in order to support the order and stability of 
the city, and when factions loom he will embrace whichever party supports 
“the equality of its members and the liberty of all” (467; Mason and Wokler, p. 
16). Often repeated, liberty and equality are the keys to Diderot’s politics in the 
History of the Two Indies. The unique principle of prosperity is liberty (12:48), 
since liberty to think and to write and to govern oneself lead to prosperity 
(13:302, 307). English freedom is the best government for the human spirit 
(14:2). Similarly, the French prosper if they are left free (13:220). An “instinct 
for independence” drives all peoples (17:26).
But how might wars of faction be avoided and wars of liberty encouraged? 
This is a matter of cultivating the sentiments of liberty, which include the ability 
to detach oneself from one’s particular self-interest, to be aware of human 
nature, and to consider the common good (10:120-122). These consequences 
29  The dismantling of factions need not be violent. Diderot recommends, with revolutionary 
rhetoric, “When you have sovereign authority and have to build a new, you must cleanse the air of all 
such rubbish” (ON, 380; XLIV; 107), but “all such rubbish” refers to “the distinction of conditions and 
possessions” of the different social classes in a monarchy (379; XLIII; 106). The abolition of unequal 
privileges and inequality before the law may or may not entail violence.
30  Diderot uses this phrase in HDI (1:171; 170) and also in (19:115; 209).
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can only result, however, where there is freedom of expression, since it is 
only in the light of the vigorous circulation of ideas that the common good is 
illuminated.
In addition, freedom of expression secures philosophers’ posthumous 
influence on the common good. Influence on posterity is the only kind of 
immortality Diderot aspires to, but he also has a less self-interested reason 
for encouraging debate from the grave: he envisions the work of liberty as 
a generations-long struggle, not likely to be completed in one lifetime, and 
requiring the participation of many liberal thinkers. As Benot notes, posterity is 
political for Diderot, and freedom of the press is necessary so that the struggle 
of the philosophes against tyrants and priests may not be in vain (142). Diderot 
distrusts the masses because their opinions are dictated by priests, yet he also 
recognizes their importance for any successful revolution (154). Freedom 
of expression cultivates sentiments of liberty, and only when freedom of 
expression is allowed to endure can the sentiment of liberty grow sufficiently 
general, successfully attenuating the grip of superstition on the masses.
The cumulative character of the spirit of liberty is important to note because 
sometimes Diderot is read as if he referred to the French Revolution. But when 
Diderot spoke of revolution or wars of liberty, his archetype was of course 
not the French Revolution (which began five years after his death) but more 
likely the steady, sometimes violent, but above all generations-long struggle of 
the British for liberty31. In Diderot’s view, revolutions were indeed bloody, but 
they were also collective and long-term projects. “A nation is only regenerated 
in a bath of blood”, he writes, adding, “That seems to be achieved by a long 
sequence of revolutions. The man of genius passes too quickly and leaves no 
posterity” (11:170; 184). Convulsive coup d’états do indeed occur (19:115), 
but Diderot seems not to equate these with revolution. Real, lasting change 
can only be the outcome of continuous generations of people who cultivate 
the spirit of liberty (19:115). Paradoxically, this requires that they have some 
freedom of expression first. 
Freedom of expression can alternately avoid war and bring it about. It can 
forestall war since freedom of expression allows people to effectively discern 
the common good and to practically implement it. The best way to assure 
freedom and equality is the rule of public opinion. Public opinion is the queen 
of the world, and it brings to light the “permanent interests, the health, and the 
utility” of the people (18:243-244). In this way, freedom of expression might 
make war moot. On the other hand, freedom of expression also nurtures the 
31 Diderot’s view of British history rejected the Gothic interpretation of British liberty as having 
been rooted in ancient Germanic traditions and embraced the more radical Humean narrative wherein 
Parliament heroically, if gradually, acquires liberty piecemeal from posturing monarchs. For more on 
Diderot’s view of British history, see J. H. M. Salmon, “Liberty by Degrees: Raynal and Diderot on 
The British Constitution”, History of Political Thought, 20:1 (1999), pp. 87-106.
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sentiments necessary for a war of liberty. After all, when people realize their 
shared interests, they are motivated to wage war for the common good and 
not merely themselves. Hence freedom of expression alternately contributes 
to avoiding revolution or to waging the right kind of revolution: Where the 
free circulation of ideas informs a society’s institutions, we should not expect 
war. Where there is no freedom of expression and institutions operate contrary 
to nature and the common good, we can expect a war of faction. In those 
rare instances where freedom of expression exists yet inflexible institutions 
continue to operate contrary to nature and the common good, we can expect a 
war of liberty. This was arguably the case in the American colonies.
Indeed, the desire for liberty is so strong that no people will consent 
to remain oppressed forever. Eventually, they will succeed in overcoming 
absolutism. Diderot argues that, “all arbitrary power rushes towards its own 
destruction, and that everywhere revolutions—quicker or slower, sooner or 
later—bring back the reign of liberty” (7:108; 174). This story—of nature, 
faction, despotism, and freedom—will re-enact itself in due course in the 
history of all peoples:
All [countries] follow, more or less often, a regular circle of prosperity and 
misfortune, liberty and slavery, morality and corruption, enlightenment and 
ignorance, greatness and weakness; all pass through every point of this fatal 
horizon. The law of nature, which wills that every society should gravitate to-
wards despotism and dissolution, that empires should be born and die, will not 
be suspended for any exception (19:39-42; 207).
There are two things to note here. First, Diderot’s statement about the 
“law of nature” suggests a materialist determinism, but the preceding sentence 
suggests that it is not nature itself that is propelling history through certain 
stages, but rather society’s morality (or lack thereof). Moral factors trump 
natural factors in the evaluation of war and peace. The morality of nations 
always ought to be based on the principle that “le bonheur public est la première 
loi” (18:280). But the context is that all power tends toward despotism (18:277), 
those who govern are accustomed to contempt for the people (18:260), and 
where society is almost always good, government is often bad (18:274).  
Second, as inevitable as the dissolution of immoral power may be, its end 
is not predictable. He writes of revolution, “It is a chaos whose end is hard to 
predict, which only clears after several centuries, and traces of which are never 
entirely erased, even by the happiest events” (1:172; 170). While it is certain 
that power contrary to nature will eventually be destroyed, nature, in its infinite 
complexity, does not suggest a predictable timeline.
At this point it should be clear that Diderot was by no means a pure naturalist 
and materialist. One of the most striking things about Diderot’s contributions 
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to the HDI is the moralism that he adds to a text which is otherwise often not 
particularly concerned with larger moral-philosophical issues. So, for example, 
in Book 12, what he adds to the discussion of the Spanish conquest of America 
is the reflection that the conquest should not bring any glory to the Spaniards 
if the conquest was not a benefit to the Americans (12:1-3). Right after that, 
when the use of poisoned arrows by the natives of Puerto Rico is discussed, 
Diderot adds an impassioned attack on the law of nations that the Spaniards 
claim has been violated, calling it injustice within injustice, observing that the 
only reason the Spaniards outlaw poisoned weapons is that they have firearms 
and cannons (12:9). 
It is also worth pointing out that when Diderot defends the Puerto Ricans 
from virtual slavery to the Spaniards, he is not advocating returning to the 
natural state before the arrival of the Spaniards, but argues in favor of free-
trade economic development of the island (12:16). Why won’t this happen? 
Because of the detestable vanity of the Spaniards and their ridiculous puerility 
(12:17). This is not a materialist, interest-driven explanation, but an attribution 
of causation to human pride.   
Perhaps to capture the agreement of people who might not be sympathetic 
to beggars, Diderot begins his discussion of endowed hospitals/workhouses in 
Puerto Rico by condemning many beggars as lazy and thieves, and encourages 
their incarceration and forced labor (12:29). But then he goes on to explain 
that this does not apply to the old, the sick, the unemployed soldier or sailor, 
and by the time he is finished only a small number of beggars fall under the 
initial condemnation (12:30). And he adds that the hospitals/workhouses 
designed to help the poor are in fact the sources of many vices. Among others, 
the administrators tend to divert most of the funds to their own benefit (12:31). 
By the time this discussion is finished, moral opprobrium has been transferred 
from beggars to the officials charged with disciplining them.
Diderot can sometimes sound like a Pollyanna: “Injustice was never the 
foundation of any society” (18:126) – by this he must mean that no society 
worthy of the name was so founded, or that no society ever admitted to that 
as a foundation. He argues that virtue is fruitful (18:127), and perhaps he also 
means that is true at least in the long run, since obvious vice undermines any 
people or government. His advice to the Americans is all moral: fear wealth, 
which brings corruption and inequality and the spirit of conquest (18:26). And 
public education is the key to public morality (18:26). 
Governments are rarely fully moral, and that leads them to policies that 
provoke violence. The English conquest of Canada might have led to future 
prosperity if the English had not done so much to humiliate the French 
inhabitants, which will surely mean more violence in the future (17:69). Their 
envy, zero-sum thinking, and provocation of international animosities in their 
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treatment of the Acadians can only have bad consequences (17:81-82). So some 
wars are quite justified. Thus, Diderot can endorse Thomas Paine’s Common 
Sense (18:298-304) and both defend the English colonists’ armed rebellion 
while arguing against the English case for putting down the rebellion. This war 
is justified on one side, and not on the other.
A number of scholars have remarked on the ambivalence or contradictions 
of Diderot’s political writings. It is true that he expresses many opinions, under 
cover of articulating many voices. But that can be understood as a deliberate 
strategy. John Pocock has drawn attention to a kind of paradox in his writing. 
Diderot is at once a supporter and a critic of European civilization: “the most 
arrogant of civilizations is at the same time the most radically given to criticism 
of itself”, and thus a forerunner of “the censorious and resentful world that 
we ourselves inhabit” (Pocock, 238-239). He observes that “the history which 
European philosophers told of their civilization was at least as self-contradictory 
as it was self-congratulatory” (Pocock, 247). And it was precisely this “European 
self-hatred” and “disputatious culture” that created freedom (Pocock, 247). The 
paradox is that if the so-called Enlightenment actually succeeded in finding all 
the truths, there would be no room for intellectual freedom. As Pocock puts it, 
only by not having truths and final answers can we have such freedom. The 
question is whether “the concept or the practice of liberty could have existed 
without the calamitous late antique and European habit of engaging in dispute 
over insoluble problems”, which is also to ask “whether Enlightened authors 
were not undermining their own enterprise” when they claimed to find truths 
(244). Which is precisely why Diderot’s consistency in his inability or refusal to 
arrive at fixed conclusions and stand still makes him out as the real Enlightener.
Nevertheless, we are going to try to tease out an overall consistency of 
message that preserves the criticism and the freedom. Commerce is good where 
it benefits everyone, as it is supposed to under the ideal of sharing in the benefits 
of the increased wealth produced by comparative advantage. Commerce is 
bad if it is imposed under unfair conditions and with unfair results. War is 
good if it ends tyranny or despotism, and bad if it diminishes liberty, equality, 
and prosperity. Peace is good if it cultivates the latter, but bad if it freezes 
inequalities and oppression. These contrasts could be expanded on at length, 
but the consistency will always be found in Diderot’s insistence on the primacy 
of the common good, the importance of staying within the wide limits of 
natural law, evaluating matters such as war and peace in their specific contexts, 
and bringing to bear moral judgments founded in a wide-ranging knowledge of 
the history of the human world.   

